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A Critical Commentary on the First Part of Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours 
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[“Truth, Knowledge, and “the Pretensions of Idealism”: A Critical Commentary on the First Part of  
Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours.” Ed. Corey Dyck and Heiner F. Klemme. Kant-Studien 109/2 (2018): 
329-51.] 
 
 Moses Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours contains, as the full title indicates, lectures on the proof 
of God’s existence.  Perhaps understandably, research on the work has largely focused on the 
Second Part of the text, both because it contains those proofs and because it contains his 
elaboration of a purified pantheism, a central element of his contribution to the notorious 
“pantheism controversy” between him and Jacobi. By contrast, the First Part of the text has 
received only passing attention1. Yet the First Part deserves a better fate, since it contains 
Mendelssohn’s mature views on truth, knowledge, and the dispute between idealists and dualists.  
The aim of the following article is accordingly to provide a critical commentary on four central 
themes of the First Part, namely, Mendelssohn’s treatments of (1) thinkable truths, (2) actual 
truths, (3) the types of knowledge, and (4) the case against idealism.  
 
1.  Thinkable truths and contradiction 
Mendelssohn opens the First Part of Morning Hours with a discussion of truth. The discussion 
begins with truth in the sense of ‘truthfulness’ where a person “says nothing other than” what she 
“thinks”. But he immediately shifts his attention from the truth or candidness of the speaker to 
the question of truth as a matter of what the speaker says. Mendelssohn entertains two possible 
ways of defining truth in this sense, one involving four elements (words, thoughts, things and 
their agreement) and one involving three elements (words, thoughts, and their agreement). 
Setting the stage for the question of idealism that preoccupies him for much of the work, 
Mendelssohn makes the observation that we have direct access to thoughts but not to the things 
they allegedly designate.  Hence, he concludes, we have no way of comparing things directly to 
thoughts to see if the latter are accurately represented by the thoughts (supposing the things exist 
at all).  Hence, without disputing the correctness of the former definition, he deems it 
“unfruitful” and opts for understanding truth as the agreement of what is said with the thoughts 
designated by the speech. Thus, on the opening pages of Morning Hours, the leading question is 
that of truth without qualification (hence, the opening section’s title: Was ist Wahrheit?) but 
Mendelssohn proposes to answer it in terms of “truth in talking” (Wahrheit im Reden) or “truth 
in speaking” (Wahrheit im Sprechen)2. 
 
Yet, while interesting in its own right, Mendelssohn’s way of steering the definition of truth in 
general towards the relation of thoughts and words, is misleading as an introduction to the 
ensuing discussions.  It is misleading since, after stating that truth can be determined by 
comparing thoughts with words, he promptly leaves this general definition behind and turns – 
without further explanation – to thoughts alone. He observes that thoughts can be considered 
from two different sides, namely, in terms of either their thinkability or their actuality. By 
actuality is meant the truth of what is thought and said insofar it is a way of thinking and 
speaking about things, what we might deem actual truth (despite our lack of direct access to the 
things).  But there is also a way of attributing truth to thoughts simply, namely, in terms of their 
thinkability.  Accordingly, Mendelssohn also entertains a category of thinkable truth that 
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includes the truths of the different types of thoughts, i.e., concepts, judgments, and inferences 
respectively.  He begins with an account of the latter types of thinkable truths. 
 
When we entertain a concept, we think of various characteristics (Merkmale), e.g., when we 
entertain the concept of circle, we think of figure, curvature, and so forth. A concept is true if its 
characteristics do not cancel one another out, making it possible to think of them at the same 
time. The determination of conceptual truth thus turns on specifying (defining) the characteristics 
of a presumed concept and examining their compatibility. What is thought or entertained in the 
definition or specification of the concept of a circle (‘plane figure,’ ‘all the points of which are 
equidistant from a center point’) is thinkable, what is entertained in that of the concept of the 
greatest speed is not. (The concept of the greatest speed requires thoughts of the smallest time 
and the greatest space, both of which are separately unthinkable, let alone together.)  The concept 
of circle is, Mendelssohn submits, a true concept, whereas that of the greatest speed is not3.   
 
A judgment is true when characteristics contained in the total concept of the subject are 
“asserted” individually of it and false if something other than a characteristic of it is asserted of 
it.  So the judgments ‘human beings can laugh’ and ‘human beings can make use of grammar’ 
are true, whereas the judgment ‘dogs can, too’ is not.  A judgmental truth is thus closely tied to a 
conceptual truth; in Kant’s terminology we might say that Mendelssohn takes judgmental truths 
to be analytic in the sense that they presuppose the analysis of the concept indicated by the 
grammatical subject of the corresponding sentence.  In contrast to his gloss on conceptual truth, 
Mendelssohn explicitly appeals to verbal phenomena – i.e., what is “asserted” – to characterize 
judgmental truths. Yet he does so without relating the account of this particular, thinkable truth 
back to the general definition of truth. The same holds for his account of inferential truths.   
 
Just as analysis of the relevant concept or concepts is required to determine a concept’s truth or a 
judgment’s truth, so, too, the truths of inferences are “grounded upon a correct analysis of 
concepts”4.  Mendelssohn in fact envisions a system of rational inferences, modeling it (like 
Descartes’ arbor sapientiae) as a tree with common characteristics (the trunk) running through 
all the divisions and subdivisions (limbs, branches of limbs, branches of branches, and so on).  
On this model, what is said of the higher concepts (the trunk or the central branches) pertains to 
all the lower concepts but obviously not vice versa. “The truth of rational inferences consists, 
therefore, in nothing less than the possibility or impossibility of unifying certain concepts and 
characteristics in thought”5.  
 
The truths of concepts, judgments, and inferences are, in sum, a matter of thinkability.  Every 
instance of human knowledge concerned solely with what is thinkable or not, such as that found 
in “mathematics and logic,” acquires or preserves its certainty through the principle of 
contradiction (the ultimate criterion of joint thinkability) that brings with it “the highest degree of 
evidence”6. The common mark of these truths is, he adds, the fact that they are “necessary and 
immutable and thus independent of time”7. Although these truths are necessarily thinkable, they 
are obviously not necessarily thought.  To the contrary, thinking these thoughts is something that 
comes to be and passes away, without undermining their necessity. 
 
2. Actual truths and induction 
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The sphere of actual truths is more limited than that of thinkable truths. Whereas everything 
actual must be thinkable, the reverse does not hold. Being non-contradictory secures thinkability 
but not actuality. Mendelssohn accordingly reasons that some principle other than that 
contradiction is needed for determining truths about what is actual.  
We have to look for another basic principle that might provide  
the boundary-line between the actual and non-actual with the  
same precision that the principle of contradiction distinguishes  
what can be thought from what cannot8.   
The place to start to locate that principle is, he submits, our knowledge of ourselves insofar as we 
actually think and represent things. In this respect, Mendelssohn maintains, we can distinguish 
between an ideal and a real actuality.  Whereas a person’s thoughts and representations of things, 
even true thoughts and representations, have merely an ideal actuality as the object of her 
thinking and representing, they come to be and pass away in the person herself whose 
“actuality…is not merely ideal but real”9.  
 
But just as the person is not simply a changing thought but the thinking being who endures (i.e., 
something really actual), so the possibility presents itself that what is thought or represented is 
really actual as well – albeit, to be sure, not insofar as it is simply thought. This possibility brings 
us back to the question of actual truth:  
But how are we convinced [überführt] that these things  
(Q1) outside of us also have an actual existence and are  
something more than mere thoughts in us?10  
Q1 may be construed as Mendelssohn’s version of the question of our knowledge of the external 
world. Yet, notably, he does not frame the question, at least immediately, as a matter of 
knowledge. Whereas our nature compels us, he notes, to assume the relevant actual existence of 
many things and to do so confidently, the question remains of the reasons “why we have no 
doubts regarding them”11. As this last remark (together with Q1) suggests, Mendelssohn’s 
concern here is with the reason (Grund) or warrant (Rechenschaft) for believing or being 
convinced that certain thoughts have the status of actual truths, i.e., that what is thought is in 
some respect not merely ideally actual but, like ourselves, really actual.  The operative thought 
seems to be that the reasons would be sufficient (hinlänglich) in some respect for us, as a matter 
of fact, to harbor no doubts regarding the things for which they are reasons. Yet he is careful not 
to say that, given those reasons, we cannot have any such doubts. Since the question here 
concerns actual truths, i.e., the truth about actual things, the sufficiency of any such reasons is by 
no means absolute.  Presumably, having reasons that are sufficient in some respect for belief is 
tantamount to knowing for Mendelssohn where ‘knowing’ is, it bears noting, a matter of 
warranted, i.e., more or less justificatory beliefs12.   
 
The question of actual truth (Q1) obviously arises with regard to objects that seem to make an 
impression upon us, since we often merely imagine, dream, or delude ourselves into thinking 
objects of this sort to be really actual. We distinguish the objective order of our impressions 
when we are alert and awake from the purely subjective order of experiences characteristic of 
states of passion, drunkenness, rapture, madness, and dreams.  In these states, under the thrall of 
imagination or various interests, we entertain “thoughts and actions that do not correspond to the 
actual state of things” (even leading in some cases to somnambulance and the like)13. These 
considerations correspond to Mendelssohn’s characterization (noted above) of representations as 
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ideal actualities.  In line with this characterization, he distinguishes the mere representation 
(Vorstellung) of something from the exhibition or display (Darstellung) of it. Errors and 
deceptions occur on this level (i.e., in regard to actual truths) when a representation, of itself 
indubitable, is supposed also to exhibit or display something on hand outside us14. 
 
One apparent way to differentiate these sorts of mental images that have only an ideal actuality 
from representations of actual things – i.e., differentiate mere representations of something from 
representations that display it – is to heed the degree of agreement (“customary combination”) of 
different senses. “What we know through a sensation alone has for itself merely the supposition 
of actuality, a supposition grounded on the customary combination of sensory appearances”15. 
Suppose that someone first enters a dark room and, without seeing anything or anyone, she feels 
and hears something scurrying about her feet. The combination of feeling a more or less familiar 
touch and hearing a more or less familiar sound in close temporal and spatial proximity gives her 
reason to believe that something (a cat?) is in the room. If, as her eyes become adjusted to the 
faint reddish light in the room, she detects the shadow of a figure corresponding to a cat, she has 
additional reason. Mendelssohn’s own examples are the touch, sight, and smell of a rose or a 
piece of salt, encountered at various distances and through different media (air, water, glass).  
 
Informing ourselves of the impressions that the same objects make on others and even animals 
(imagine her friend or her dog accompanying her into the dark room) provides further evidence 
that certain sensory representations depict things actually on hand outside us16. The degree to 
which we concur in relevant respects despite occupying diverse points of view brings us one step 
closer to a complete induction17. This movement towards more complete inductions corresponds 
to what Mendelssohn regards as “the positive power of the soul” to grasp what is not merely a 
matter of its perspective and limitations18.“The more agreement that is found in all this, the more 
we believe ourselves assured of the external actuality,” just as the more that we find discordance, 
the more dubious we become of its external actuality19. 
 
Once we have reason to believe in the existence of the object, we can apply all the truths of 
mathematics that apply to the concept of the object. Thus, the concept of a rose includes 
geometrical concepts, e.g., size, shape. So, too, applying the principle of contradiction, we can 
sort out what does and what does not belong to the concept in question.  From these applications, 
we arrive at true propositions (Wahrheitssätze), the subjects of which have the evidence of 
sensory knowledge, and the predicates of which are due to applied mathematical and logical 
rules.  With these propositions in hand, we proceed to inferences that lead to the doctrinal edifice 
(Lehrgebäude) of applied mathematics and logic in physics. Regrettably, Mendelssohn does not 
give any examples here.  Nonetheless, his general message is clear and compelling, namely, that 
necessary and universal claims have a place within physics insofar as the physical concepts are 
logically and mathematically analyzable. 
 
But there is far more to the scope of actual truths, Mendelssohn insists, than logical and 
mathematical analysis of concepts affords. Experience of the appearances of an object enable us 
to determine further (a) the object’s properties or, more precisely, the properties of the sort of 
thing it is and (b) the probabilities of combinations of it (or its properties) with other objects (or 
their properties) in various circumstances.  The greater the frequency of the combination or 
succession of appearances, the more confidence we have of iterations of the same.  Such 
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experiences lead, Mendelssohn notes, to “endless” propositions in ordinary life and physics, 
allowing us to make inferences that, while lacking “the irrefutable certainty” of logic and 
mathematics, have “the degree of conviction that is founded on the doctrine of probability and is 
called ‘induction’”20. 
   
By induction, Mendelssohn chiefly understands an inference grounded on the frequency of a 
sequence. He appeals, as noted above, to a form of induction based upon iterations of 
combinations of senses in oneself, others, and animals to establish the probable veracity of 
certain sensory experiences (“what we know through sensation alone”).  But induction also 
serves importantly as the basis for establishing relations among the things known through 
sensory experiences. From the fact that a foregoing appearance of a certain sort (cause) is 
frequently succeeded by a subsequent appearance of a certain sort (effect), we come to the 
“grounded supposition” (gegründete Vermuthung) that they stand in connection with one 
another21. He introduces the concept of a “ground” to identify the characteristic in a cause from 
which an effect may be inferred. From the nourishing features of bread, we can infer that its 
consumption will provide nourishment. In this way, “every effect is grounded in its cause”22.   
 
This inference from a ground is, Mendelssohn submits, what distinguishes human knowledge 
from an animal’s expectations of similar effects from similar causes.  Whereas the experience of 
the precariousness of a sharp incline leads animals to “associate” the idea of falling with that of 
an incline and to react with fear at the sight of the latter, an analogous experience leads humans 
to “form for themselves the universal rational proposition: ‘all heavy bodies slide down surfaces 
on an incline’”23.  That proposition is the first premise of the inference that heavy bodies will 
slide down the incline presently encountered.  The experience also leads human beings to 
suppose that there is something in the idea of the incline that makes comprehensible the 
possibility of falling. A philosopher can add knowledge of the ground on the basis of mechanics, 
thereby bringing “the general proposition closer to purely rational knowledge”24.  Yet, while 
someone with knowledge of physics can subsume it under laws of motion, gravity, and the like, 
the ground of the proposition, like that of those laws themselves, is, Mendelssohn submits, “not 
scientific, not purely rational knowledge, but an incomplete induction that must take the place of 
pure reason”25.  
 
Mendelssohn is quick to add that such induction, while incomplete, frequently remains utterly 
persuasive, particularly the more it approximates a complete induction.  Consider, he suggests, 
the certainty of dying or of being able, in the presence of an infant, to conduct business that must 
be kept secret. The conviction built upon these incomplete inductions falls “only marginally 
below mathematical evidence”26.  Nevertheless, when it comes to any science of actual things, 
our knowledge has “a mixed make-up,” composed of elements from immediate sensory 
experience, “pure reason,” and principles grounded on complete or incomplete induction27.  
 
Yet “with what reason,” Mendelssohn asks,” are we justified to make inferences in these cases” 
of incomplete induction? The question replicates Hume’s question in §4, Part II of his Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding. Not coincidentally, for Mendelssohn’s complete answer to 
this question, he refers his readers to his essay On Probability where he cites and presumes to 
remove Hume’s “skeptical doubts” that there is a reason (and not simply a lively feeling). 
Nonetheless, on the final pages of the second chapter of Morning Hours, he provides what he 
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takes to be the essential elements of the answer given in that essay. When a coin is tossed, the 
odds of it coming up heads or tails are the same, all things being equal. If it repeatedly comes up 
heads, then we have reason to suppose that, far from being a matter of chance, there is some 
internal, determining ground for this outcome. (If the person tossing the coin repeatedly bets on 
heads, then we have reason to think that he is doing something to bring this about.) From this 
contrast between being and not being a matter of chance, Mendelssohn concludes that we are 
justified in supposing that regularities are due, not to “contingent causes,” but to “a reason for the 
connection”28. The more often the connection holds, the greater our certainty that an instance of 
it will be repeated29.  
 
Mendelssohn thus contends that the experience of the difference between probabilities and their 
absence gives us reason to endorse talk of causal grounds and powers (rather than simply a non-
rational custom or habit of doing so, as Hume would have it).  “The convincing power” 
(Überzeugungskraft) of probability, as he puts it, is itself ultimately based on a conception of the 
nature of human intelligence: 
It is in keeping with the nature of the human intellect [der Natur des 
menschlichen Verstandes gemäß], not to ascribe a detected agreement to  
blind chance but instead, wherever a manifold concurs, to seek  
the ground of the concurrence30. 
Curiously and without further qualification, this remark could be endorsed by Kant and Hume, in 
different ways, to be sure. 
 
Yet, as an answer to Hume’s skeptical doubts and solution to the problem of induction, the 
argument seems deeply flawed, as many authors have pointed out. For Hume, there is no non-
circular way of demonstrating the validity of induction. Past resemblances do not establish 
unqualifiedly that the present or future will resemble the past. Contra Mendelssohn, neither the 
degree of human reliance upon induction nor the amount of iterations in the past suffices to 
establish its validity. “[E]ven after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect,” 
Hume contends, “our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any 
process of the understanding”31. Hume makes clear that he is not denying that we infer from past 
experience that like causes will have like effects in the future. Nor does he deny a “probability of 
causes,” i.e., that we have a preference for what “has been found most usual.” His contention is 
simply that, since experience only informs us of past instances and not of the future, the basis for 
the inference is wanting.  In short, he fails to find any “proposition” or “intermediate step” 
connecting the proposition about the past with the proposition about the future.  Any appeal to 
probability (“probable arguments”) is pointless, he adds, since it begs the point in question32.  
 
Hume’s solution to the doubts raised is itself “skeptical,” as he puts it, since it appeals not to any 
reason or reasoning but to custom and belief. Custom is the propensity to expect the future to 
resemble the past and belief is the sentiment that custom produces.  Custom (a customary 
conjunction) leads me to associate snow and cold, so that I am led to believe (and not merely 
imagine) that it will be cold to the touch.  These operations of the soul, Hume concludes, are “a 
species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is 
able either to produce or prevent”33. 
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From the fact that my experience of the causal relation is not necessary, it does not follow that 
the relation itself is not necessary.  Part of Kant’s criticism of Hume’s analysis of causal 
reasoning moves along these lines.  While not accepting Kant’s categorial conception of the 
necessity of the causal connection, Mendelssohn disputes Hume’s contention that no reasoning 
or process of understanding is able to produce the requisite belief. In the wake of past experience 
of the regular succession of instances of two specific sorts of events, it is reasonable and, indeed, 
frequently a basis for reasoning to the conclusion that a similar succession is forthcoming and 
thus not merely coincidental.  Mendelssohn accordingly thinks that he has provided the reason 
and species of reasoning that Hume finds missing but necessary to justify inductive inferences. 
 
However, Hume’s concern is, as reviewed above, the normative question of what legitimates an 
inductive inference.  Scholars of Hume debate whether he intends that legitimation in the form of 
a deductive inference or not and whether he sees it as requiring the Uniformity of Nature as a 
universal and necessary or merely probable claim34.  Yet, however one comes down on these 
debates, his argument appears incontrovertible.  No amount or degree of evidence can legitimate 
an inductive inference since the legitimation would have to take the form of such an inference.  
In other words, it would have to presuppose that the future will or likely will resemble the past in 
ways sufficient to justify the inference.  To the extent that Mendelssohn proposes a probabilistic 
argument to justify induction, he thus begs the question, taking for granted what Hume puts in 
question35.  
  
3. Types of Knowledge 
Following his accounts of thinkable and actual truths, Mendelssohn outlines his theory of 
knowledge.  As noted above, he seems to understand knowledge in a broad sense as having a 
reason or warrant for believing something (in short, warranted beliefs).  When he turns to the 
types of knowledge, the operative word is the evidence in each case.  He identifies three different 
types of knowledge, based upon the corresponding evidence.   
 
The first is “sensory knowledge or immediate consciousness of changes in us” while we have 
sensations, experience pleasures and pains, feel desire and repugnance, hope and fear, and make 
judgments and inferences. If the ‘or’ designates a genuine disjunction, Mendelssohn is 
presumably including under this first type of knowledge not only knowledge of seeing and sight, 
hearing and sound, and the like, but also – or even primarily – our awareness of changes in a 
range of different conscious states, including but not restricted to seeing, hearing, and other such 
sensations or perceptions. He attributes all these sorts of consciousness to “immediate knowledge 
of the outer and inner sense”36.  
 
On this reading, what is particularly striking about this first type of knowledge is its object as 
well as its range, and Mendelssohn’s non-reductive account of it. By no means confining 
immediate consciousness to sensory impressions simply, he extends it to the awareness of 
changes that we experience in ourselves within a particular mental state. Presumably, he has in 
mind such experiences as hearing a sound more clearly, feeling the heightening of a desire, 
shifting from premise to conclusion while inferring as well as the transition from one such state 
to another. This awareness undoubtedly presupposes awareness of the respective state and 
content in the former case or states and contents themselves in the latter case. The forms of 
consciousness that he mentions broadly correspond to his division of mental powers into powers 
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of cognition, desire, and approval37. This sort of immediate knowledge of the changes in the 
mental states we find ourselves in might be dubbed “apperception,” in Leibniz’s sense of the 
reflexivity of a conscious state (la connoissance réflexive), i.e., a consciousness of being 
conscious in a certain way or, better, a consciousness of changing states and contents of mind38. 
 
Three further aspects of Mendelssohn’s account of immediate knowledge are worthy of note.  
The first aspect, already flagged with respect to the determination of actual truths, is the way that 
an individual’s awareness of alterations in her mental states goes hand-in-hand with an 
awareness of herself as unchanging, at least relative to the changes. Awareness of changes 
requires awareness of something unchanging and, in the case of immediate knowledge, what 
does not change, Mendelssohn submits, is something about myself39.   
 
The second aspect of immediate knowledge is a specific indubitableness. Mendelssohn contends 
that there is nothing erroneous or deceptive about instances of this immediate knowledge, 
considered simply as representations in the soul (Vorstellungen in der Seele). When I see or hear, 
when I feel pleasure or pain, when I hope or fear, it is – he claims – “beyond doubt” that I do 
so40.  Yet, as discussed below, the claim does not rule out the possibility of being deceived on 
some level by the senses (a possibility that goes hand-in-hand with the following aspect).  
 
The third aspect of immediate knowledge is the difficulty of its determination, given the way it 
amalgamates with understanding. After noting the extent to which understanding corrects for 
sensory illusions, Mendelssohn observes that, as a result, the understanding is in large part 
combined so intimately with the sensory that the “boundaries” between them are “no longer 
recognizable”41. The implications of the observation are significant, at the very least as a 
reminder of the difficulty of sorting out what is immediately known in a strict, pre-rational sense 
from what is known immediately but in a broader sense that includes the help of the 
understanding, something that can take the form of what Mendelssohn dubs “sound human 
understanding”42. Thus, the lines between immediate, non-inferential and immediate inferential 
knowledge are typically blurred. The observation also underlies Mendelssohn’s contention that 
incomplete induction is a principal source of sense deception, something that can obviously 
occur in instances of the broader sense of immediate knowledge.  
 
Whereas the first type of knowledge is “immediate” (whether narrowly or broadly conceived), 
the second type of knowledge is mediated. This second type is composed of judgments and 
inferences about what is thinkable and unthinkable.  These judgments and inferences are 
generated from the knowledge of the first type “by the correct use of the understanding” and, 
hence, Mendelssohn labels this sort of knowledge “rational knowledge”43.  
 
This second type of knowledge corresponds to thinkable truths, the third type of knowledge to 
actual truths. This type of knowledge is knowledge of “what is actual outside us,” knowledge of 
representations that we have by virtue of finding ourselves in a physical-actual word, producing 
and undergoing changes. He also dubs this third sort of knowledge “knowledge of nature”44.  
Presumably, it is possible for immediate knowledge in the broad sense (where it and 
understanding are indistinguishable) and this third type of knowledge to overlap or combine with 
one another. 
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Knowledge generally, Mendelssohn adds, is limited both by the reach and by the feebleness of 
our powers of knowing. Uncertainty and proneness to error pervade and bedevil all three types of 
knowledge. At this juncture he returns to the concept of truth, this time with a view to relating 
the type of truth to the respective type of knowledge as well as to its respective opposites. 
Whereas truth is any item of knowledge, “any thought which is an effect of the positive powers 
of our souls,” untruth is any thought produced by the incapacity or limitations of those powers.  
In the case of the understanding or reason, the untruth is an error; in the case of the senses (i.e., 
where they mislead), the untruth is an illusion or deception (Verblendung oder Sinnenbetrug) – 
though it is also possible for a line of thinking to be composed of both error and illusion45. In 
these ways Mendelssohn emphasizes the limitedness of knowing and he does so by underscoring 
the co-existence of truth and untruth in any instance of knowledge. 
Any given item of human knowledge is, therefore, partially true and 
partially untrue, since it is the effect of a power that has its own bounds and 
limitations46. 
As noted earlier, Mendelssohn’s conception of knowledge hardly conforms to a proto-Platonic 
conception of it as suitably justified, true belief.  In the opening chapters of Morning Hours, he 
appears to equate knowledge with having reasons or warrant for belief.  The present passage 
(from the third chapter) complements the treatment from the opening chapters by noting that the 
reasons or warrant are always incomplete and defeasible.  
 
Notably, Mendelssohn advances this claim for all three types of knowledge. Despite being 
indubitable in a certain respect (as noted above), sensory knowledge is open to illusion thanks to 
the feebleness of our sensory powers and their contingent dependency upon a particular position 
in the environment (e.g., we see something as round when it is really square, in part because we 
are seeing it from afar – though seeing it as far seems to betray the role of conceptuality and 
understanding). Similarly, rational knowledge is prone to mistaken calculations, inferential 
fallacies, and the like, in each case failing to abide in practice to the indubitable principle of 
contradiction47. Actual knowledge must have recourse to induction that is always incomplete. 
Just as there is a kind of sensory knowledge that is indistinguishable from its mediation by the 
understanding, so there are illusions and deceptions on this level whose “principal source” is 
incomplete induction.  
 
A chart of Mendelssohn’s conceptions of truth and knowledge 
 
truth    criteria    knowledge  
      
            (a)  immediate, non-inferential, sensory and/or apperceptive 
 
(1) actual  induction  (b1) immediate, (tacitly) inferential, sensory (common sense) 
       induction  (b2) mediated, (explicitly) inferential, sensory and rational 
  
(2) thinkable contradiction (c)   mediated, (explicitly) inferential, rational  
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As this chart indicates, Mendelssohn’s account of the two types of truth does not coincide neatly 
with the three types of knowledge.  Presumably, however, the first two types of knowledge – (a) 
and (b) – generate actual truths, while the third (c) alone generates thinkable truths. 
 
4. Existence and “the pretensions of idealists” 
Mendelssohn defines ‘existence’ (Dasein) as “merely a common term for affecting and 
suffering” (würken und leiden), doing something to something and having something done to 
oneself. This definition is misleading, however, if taken to mean that existence is nothing over 
and above acting upon and being acted upon, i.e., if taken to mean that acting and being acted 
upon do not entail an agent and recipient, respectively.  Mendelssohn immediately adds that we 
are conscious, at every moment of our life, of acting upon something or undergoing something.  
This qualification strongly suggests that he understands acting and undergoing (as we might also 
translate leiden) in phenomenal terms, i.e., in ways inseparable from the consciousness of them.  
Presumably, this reference to consciousness is a reference to our awareness of what it feels like 
to be affecting or suffering something, contemporary and coincident with awareness of itself or, 
equivalently, its existence as common to both operations (that of affecting or suffering)48. 
 
Yet these observations are misleading, insofar as they suggest an equivalence if not an equation 
of existence with consciousness, the consciousness of acting and/or suffering. As discussed 
below, Mendelssohn plainly rejects an idealist argument along these lines (i.e., an argument 
insisting on an equation of existing and consciousness). In addition, shortly before the discussion 
where he identifies existence as the “identifying mark” of acting and suffering, Mendelssohn 
argues that “my own existence” is a necessary condition of thinking at all. If the existence of 
changes in me (e.g., “thoughts and sensations”) is undeniable, so, he contends, is the I that 
“suffers” them. He seems, in other words, to accept that a full account of doing entails 
consideration of the doer, just as a full account of suffering entails consideration of the sufferer. 
While existence is always a matter of doing or undergoing, it also a matter of who or what 
respectively affects and is affected in the process. So, too, in the case of the ego, existence is not 
simply the consciousness of acting or undergoing but the presence, indeed, the ongoing presence 
of that consciousness. 
 
Further supporting this interpretation is Mendelssohn’s claim that “where changes exist, a 
subject must also be on hand there”49. In other words, the onhandness of the subject (or what he 
elsewhere dubs its “real actuality”) is a necessary and necessarily constant condition of changes.  
This reading is consistent with the fact that Mendelssohn not only endorses the Cartesian dictum 
“I think, therefore I am,” but also emends it to the effect that it is no less true that “I hope, 
therefore I am; I fear, therefore I am; and so on”50. Whatever the sort of consciousness, it entails 
(and thus is distinguishable albeit inseparable from) the existence of the subject of that 
consciousness51. At the same time, this reading leaves open the possibility – rejected by Leibniz 
– of the existence of something that acts or suffers not only unconsciously but in ways not 
analogous to a spiritual substance.  As discussed below, Mendelssohn’s argument against 
idealism appears to rely upon this possibility, though his appeal to it proves problematic in 
certain respects.  
 
Mendelssohn gives the preceding gloss on the conception of existence in the fifth chapter of the 
First Part of Morning Hours. In the final two chapters, with this conception of existence in hand, 
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he specifically targets idealism52.  He does so, at least in part, because of its proximity to his own 
views. Idealists countenance, he notes, three features in common with his own position: (a) the 
distinction between the actual existence of the thinker and the ideal existence of the thinker’s 
thoughts (representations), (b) the possibility of other such thinkers (thereby rejecting solipsism), 
and (c) the difference between the objective order of ideas in a waking state and the subjective 
order of them in altered states53. What the idealists deny and Mendelssohn accepts (at least at this 
stage in his dialectic) is the existence of material substances as well as spiritual substances.  
Taking their cues from the fact that our immediate knowledge of existence is the knowledge that 
we have of thinking, idealists question whether there is any reason to extend existence to what 
does not think but is only thought.  
 
Mendelssohn counters with the observation that we have strong, inductive reasons for supposing 
that not everything that we represent to ourselves is the product of perspective and illusion. The 
agreement we find in our representations (individual and shared) points to “a common 
ground...outside us”54.  Nor can the dualist (someone who countenances both material and 
spiritual substances) be charged with transferring her own experiences of extension and motion, 
as modifications of her conscious representations, to these substances.  When she attributes 
motion and extension to material substances, she is merely saying that they manifest themselves 
as mobile and extended, and that they do so to any thinking being – to the best of our knowledge 
or, better, to the best of our personal and collective inductions, we might add. 
 
A final idealist objection, addressed by Mendelssohn in the final chapter of the First Part, is 
particularly significant, since his way of addressing it introduces two problems with his account.  
The first problem concerns a possible equivocation in his appeal to existence.  The second 
problem concerns the unresolved character of the dispute between idealists and dualists, leading 
him to entertain a novel, meta-philosophical viewpoint that can be interpreted as distancing his 
own settled view from idealism, dualism, or any of their philosophical competitors (materialism, 
skepticism, solipsism). 
 
The objection surfaces after Mendelssohn has the dualist chastising the idealist for pretending 
that there is something more to words like ‘extended’ and ‘mobile’ when they are attributed to 
the material substance, since the attribution draws (according to the idealist) on their attribution 
to ourselves as spiritual substances. The idealist replies that it is Mendelssohn who is guilty of 
linguistic confusion by confusing the idea of the substance itself with what it does.   The idealist 
then poses the question: 
All of the properties ascribed by you to this prototype are, by your own  
Q2  admission, mere accidents of the soul. We want to know, however, what this  
prototype itself is, not what it might do55. 
Q2 is an idealist objection to Mendelssohn’s defense of dualism up to this point. The objection 
presents him with two alternatives.  Since the relation of accidents to a subject is, the idealist 
submits, understandable to us on the level of spiritual substances, either that relation is 
surreptitiously invoked by the dualist or, if not, the dualist owes us an account of that relation (an 
account that does not piggyback on the experience of ourselves as spiritual substances). To the 
extent that Mendelssohn does not provide such an account, his account confounds a meaningful 
use of the terminology depicting a substance-accident relation with one lacking meaning. 
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Mendelssohn responds to this criticism by invoking his account of existence – or at least part of 
it – from chapter five, arguing that once it has been settled what a thing does or undergoes, the 
question of what it is “in and for itself” is unintelligible, containing “empty words” devoid of 
sense56. This response is problematic, for reasons of both consistency and substance. In chapter 
five, as noted above, he appears to acknowledge, in the case of spiritual substances, the 
distinction between the substance’s existence (regardless of its relation to consciousness) and its 
actions and undergoings. Even if inseparable, the existing subject and its changing properties are 
distinct and thus distinguishable from one another, prompting a veritably intelligible question of 
what the subject is “in and for itself”. Yet Mendelssohn, in reply, seems to make matters worse 
in two ways, first by denying that a material substance (in contrast to its supposed accidents) can 
be an object of knowledge at all (“we stand at the limits of knowledge”), and second by accusing 
the idealist of asking for a concept that is actually no concept. The former reply does not help the 
dualist since it surrenders the idea of knowing material substances. Nor is the latter reply helpful 
since it plays into the idealist’s hand by denying the conceivability of such substances57. 
 
Mendelssohn’s initial response to the idealist objection (Q2) is muddled in the ways just outlined. 
However, as if aware of its inadequacy, he immediately cites a remark that casts a pall on the 
entire dispute, including his own part in it.  That remark (attributed to an unnamed 
“philosopher”) is the suggestion that all such quarrels are merely verbal disputes, more befitting 
linguists than philosophers58. Little is said to follow up this remark, at least in the final chapter of 
Part One, leaving readers rightly puzzled about the force of the remark.   
 
However, he returns to the dispute in chapter ten of the Second Part.  But he does only after 
noting a further argument in the idealist’s favor, namely, the alleged superfluity and vacuity of 
the notion of a material substance. Iterating a point already made in the First Part, Mendelssohn 
concedes that idealists accept the difference between the subjective and objective order of ideas, 
and do so without recognizing material substances.  Hence, they regard positing material 
substances as superfluous and even vacuous since the prototype supposedly underlying the 
objective series “provides him with nothing more to think since he knows no way of making any 
representations of it beyond the depiction of it that is to be found in his soul”59. 
 
Mendelssohn hopes to respond to these objections by means of the image of a room adorned with 
mirrors, each depicting the same object, doing so from the mirror’s respective location. Knowers, 
conceived as mirrors, cannot determine whether the image they depict is based upon a real object 
or not (Mendelssohn supposes some sort of unexplained contrivance whereby the depicted image 
could be the result of an artist’s depiction.) However, as the idealists contend, the determination 
is of no consequence to them, i.e., to their ability to distinguish truth from illusion or, more 
generally, the objective from the subjective order of ideas.  Rather unpersuasively, Mendelssohn 
responds that since the idealists are able to make this distinction, any further disagreement on 
their part is “a mere grumbling over words”60. This remark iterates Mendelssohn’s initial move 
of attributing the linguistic confusion to the idealist alone rather than attributing the entire 
dispute (as the unnamed philosopher does) to linguistic confusion.  Mendelssohn’s final remark 
about the idealist position on this score shows his hand even more clearly. Since the idealists can 
make the appropriate discriminations on the basis of agreements in their depictions, what 
justifies, he asks, their denial of the material substance “as the ground of their agreement”61? Yet 
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appealing to material substances in this way simply begs the question, presuming what the 
idealists are calling into question.  
 
In sum, Mendelssohn does not fare well in his attempt to refute the idealist position head-on. In 
addition to begging the question, he is impaired by ambiguities both in his account of existence 
and in his charges of linguistic confusion.62 Not to be overlooked in all this, however, is the fact 
that he himself is the source of the strong case for the idealist position. Without question, 
moreover, there is a certain degree of rhetorical guile at work, since he clearly wants to give the 
nod to common sense (sound common understanding) over rational speculation when they are at 
odds63.  Such is the message of the much-discussed allegory, also in chapter ten, where he treats 
common sense and reason.  In chapter three he contends that “sound human understanding and 
reason are at bottom one and the same”, their difference consisting merely in the fact that 
common sense rushes in, where reason is plodding, treading fearfully64. For most of life, we have 
to rely upon common sense inferences, where reason has not had the time to make all the distinct 
inferences called for, should that be possible at all65.  
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19 Morning Hours, 6. Mendelssohn does not take the trouble to differentiate explicitly the determination 
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20 Morning Hours, 7.  
21 Morning Hours, 9. 
22 Ibid. 
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idea. Yet his contrast of the animal’s “association” of the ideas with the human’s formulation of a general 
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24 Morning Hours, 9; making up “a threefold source of knowledge” here, as Mendelssohn puts it with 
respect to the incline, are (i) animal instinct involving an association of ideas, (ii) experience involving 
ordinary practical use of a principle based upon experience, and (iii) philosophical insight into the 
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von der Lühe, 152-154. 
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26 Morning Hours, 12. 
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morals, Mendelssohn observes, that he is unable to pursue in Morning Hours. 
28 Mendelssohn adds that the degree of conviction in that reason is proportional to certainty as the number 
of observed instances n is to n +1.  For critical commentary on Mendelssohn’s mathematics, reasoning, 
and starting assumption (based upon his argument in On Probability), see Edith Sylla, “Mendelssohn, 
Wolff, and Bernoulli” in Moses Mendelssohn’s Metaphysics and Aesthetics, 47-52; on the historical 
background and influence, see too, von der Lühe, 158n48 and Hans Lausch, “Moses Mendelssohn und die 
zeitgenössische Mathematik” in Moses Mendelsssohn im Spannungsfeld der Aufklärung, 133-135. 
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29 Morning Hours, 13: “We suppose, therefore, that the inner, constant properties of A have brought about 
the appearance B.  That is to say, we infer a causal connection; let us call A the cause, B the effect, and let 
us call the constant properties of A or their enduring presence in A the power”.  Mendelssohn does not 
specify how this concept of power differs from that of ground. The difference may lie in his association of 
power with the potential for producing an effect.  Thus, he speaks of the fire’s power to expand bodies 
where the outcome has not yet occurred or been experienced. But he also uses ‘ground’ and ‘power’ in 
ways that seem interchangeable. Thus, as an example of power, he speaks of the “internal make-up” of 
bread that brings about its nourishing effects.  Yet after claiming that these considerations underlie all the 
laws of nature, he makes the supposedly explanatory observation: “Similar subjects will have also similar 
predicates by virtue of the inner ground, i.e., reason for the connection” (Morning Hours, 14). Ambition, 
for example, is a common ground of several different actions of the same person. 
30 Morning Hours, 15. 
31 David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, 
third edition, ed. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), 32. 
32 Ibid. 32-39; 57f. Hume also supposes the lack of any known connection between sensible qualities and 
“secret powers” (ibid. 33). 
33 Ibid. 43-50.	
34 See Peter Millican, “Hume's Argument Concerning Induction: Structure and Interpretation" in David 
Hume: Critical Assessments, volume 2, edited by Stanley Tweyman (Routledge, 1995), 91–144. 
35 In Mendelssohn’s defense, it deserves noting that Hume himself does not always neatly separate the 
normative from the factual question. Hence, as von der Lühe puts it, Mendelssohn does not regard the 
“psychological” dimension as merely irrational; see von der Lühe, 153f. 
36 Revisiting this first type of knowledge in a later chapter, he speaks of “immediate sensory knowledge” 
and “intuiting knowledge”, spanning sensations of the outer sense and perceptions of the inner sense; see 
Morning Hours, 26. 
37 See “On the ability to know, the ability to feel, and the ability to desire” in Philosophical Writings, 
trans. D. Dahlstrom (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 309f. Since Mendelssohn reckons all these 
forms of immediate knowledge to intuitions of inner and outer sense, it is possible that he thinks of them 
as all having a sensory component or something akin to that.  However, at least in Morning Hours, he 
does not explicitly state as much. 
38 See G. W. F. Leibniz, “Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce, fondés en raison” in Philosophischen 
Schriftten, Band 6, hrsg. C. I. Erhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1885), 600. 
39 The apperceptive character of immediate knowledge thus entails self-consciousness. My consciousness 
of being conscious of change and, indeed, of being so repeatedly suffices for my identification of myself 
as the enduring subject.  Precisely on this score Kant differs, as his “Refutation of Idealism” attests. 
40 Morning Hours, 26; see, too, Morning Hours, 28: “Empfindungen können nicht trügen.” Mendelssohn 
stresses the importance of this indubitableness for taste and moral sentiments; see Morning Hours, 27f.  
41 Morning Hours, 17. 
42 Morning Hours, 20f; see, too, n. 16 above. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Morning Hours, 17f; Mendelssohn iterates these definitions of truth and untruth at the end of the 
chapter; see Morning Hours, 21. 
46 Morning Hours, 18. The analogue to Heidegger’s conception of being at once in the truth and in the 
untruth, revealing and concealing, is noteworthy. 
47Morning Hours, 26f. 
48 This consciousness may explain his remark that existence is the “identifying mark” of these two 
behaviors, a remark reinforcing the conclusion that ‘existence’ is not simply an unqualified term for them.  
The point would then be that I am always conscious of either acting upon something or suffering 
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something, such that these alternatives are distinct, exhaust the possibilities, and yet have consciousness 
in common. Note, too, that this characterization of existence, when applied to ourselves, corresponds to 
Mendelssohn’s characterization of immediate knowledge as awareness of changes in our consciousness. 
49 Morning Hours, 29. This phrasing suggests a difference between ‘existence’ and ‘being on hand’ 
(Heidegger’s Vorhandensein), though he also appears to use the terms synonymously. On the reading 
suggested here, Mendelssohn’s views would coincide with Wolff’s general account of substance as a 
“perdurable and modifiable subject”, exemplified by a rock; see Christian Wolff, Philosophia Prima, sive 
Ontologia (Frankfurt/Leipzig: Regner, 1736), §768, S. 574; see, too, ibid., 575: “Et ex determinationibus 
constantibus & variabilibus in eodem subject coexistentibus colligimus entis substantialitatem”.  
50 Morning Hours, 29.  51	‘Entail’ may be the wrong term here. Sometimes, to be sure, Mendelssohn speaks in terms of a 
condition that seems to serve as an enthymeme, e.g., if there are changes in my thoughts, then there must 
be an unchanging thinker (Morning Hours, 29).  But he also speaks of these thoughts as “dwell[ing] 
inwardly in me...perceived [as] alterations in my faculty of thinking” (meinem Innern beywohnen, und als 
Abänderungen meines Denkvermögens von mir wahrgenommen); Morning Hours, 5.    
52 For obvious reasons, he also labels idealists “spiritualists,” distinguishing them from “materialists” 
(Morning Hours, 41f). Whom precisely does he have in mind? Although Mendelssohn does not say, the 
most likely candidates, it would seem, are adherents of Leibniz’s or Berkeley’s thought. In differentiating 
his view from Leibniz on this score, Mendelssohn would be in line with Wolff; for the relevant difference 
between Wolff and Leibniz, see Jean École, “Cosmologie wolffienne et dynamique leibnizienne: Essais 
sur le rapport de Wolff avec Leibniz,” Les études philosophiques, 19 (1964), 5 and Charles A. Corr, 
“Christian Wolff and Leibniz,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 36/2 (1975), 256. Dyck takes Kantian, 
transcendental idealists as well as Berkeleyian empirical idealists to be the target of Mendelssohn’s 
refutation of idealism, as part of a strategy of undermining Kant’s attempt to differentiate the two forms 
of idealism; see Dyck, 166-68. Guyer notes the deep similarity of Mendelssohn’s construal of idealists 
with that of Baumgarten; both argue for dualism on the basis of the greater perfection of a world housing 
both material and spiritual substances; see Guyer, 144f.	
53 On this last point of agreement, see Morning Hours, 62. 
54 Morning Hours, 39; see, too, ibid. 121. Mendelssohn also affirms both my existence and my mutability; 
see Morning Hours, 61; see, too, ibid. 61: “If I am mutable, then diverse, opposite predicates are at the 
same time thinkable within me as subject”. 
55 Morning Hours, 41. 
56 Ibid. The demand for answers to this question presumably reflects what Mendelssohn dubs “the 
pretentions of the idealists” (Morning Hours, 38). Notably, his rejection of the question’s presumption – 
namely, that things are knowable in themselves – indicates a level of agreement with Kant. From the fact 
that Mendelssohn sees this boundary of knowledge as applying to all knowers, not only human knowers, 
Dyck infers that these lines are directed at “the Kantian idealist,” see Dyck, 172f. Guyer also instructively 
relates Kant’s refutation of idealism to Mendelssohn’s account in Morgenstunden, pointing out how they 
differ in (a) their embrace of idealism and (b) their views of self-knowledge.  Thus, (a) whereas Kant 
insists on the non-spatial and non-temporal character of things in themselves, Mendelssohn countenances 
a modest idealism (“the anodyne truth of idealism” (Guyer 143), i.e., the truism that we can only know 
things as we represent them) and (b) self-knowledge, while dependent for Kant upon belief in the 
existence of enduring objects, follows for Mendelssohn simply from an individual’s perception of 
changes in her thoughts and representations as changes in herself as the one – and, indeed, the same one – 
thinking those thoughts (Guyer 151-153). Both of Guyer’s points are well-taken, although it deserves 
noting (as Guyer himself does, to be sure) that Mendelssohn, far from describing his own position as 
idealism, roundly criticizes it.  
57 Morning Hours, 41f. 
58 Morning Hours, 42. 
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because this prototype provides him with nothing more to think since he knows no way of making any 
representations of it beyond the depiction of it that is to be found in his soul.” 
60 Morning Hours, 63. 
61 Ibid. 
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Ernst Cassirer, “Die Philosophie Moses Mendelssohns (1929)”, in Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XVII: 
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Meiner, 2004), 115-137.    
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phenomenologically but not epistemically; see Paul Franks, “Divided by Common Sense: Mendelssohn 
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205f. 
